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Defendant, Pro-Tech Restoration dba Stone Carpets (hereinafter "Stone Carpets"), by and 
through its counsel, M. Dayle Jeffs, submits the following Appellee's Brief on Appeal: 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this case is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
78-2-2(4) Utah Code, 78-2(a)-3(2)(k) Utah Code, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Properly Denied Mrs. Carrier's Rule 60(b) Motion Attempting to 
Add Grounds For Curing The Failed Rule 59 Motion For New Trial. 
The court reviews the denial of the Motion for Relief from Judgment and a Motion for 
a New Trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Since the trial court has broad discretion in 
granting and denying such motions, the abuse of that discretion is the standard by which the 
rulings on such motions will be made. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993); Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 228-29 (Utah 
1983); Boyce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1980); Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 
(Utah 1984); cf. Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982). Not only is a 
ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion in the discretion of the trial court, but that discretion is quite 
broad, Birch v. Birch. 771, P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). The trial judge's determination 
will be reversed only if the ruling is so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and 
capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993). 
POINT n 
The Trial Court Applied The Proper Law in Allowing Each Adverse Co-Defendant 
The Full Number of Peremptory Challenges. 
This defendant asserts that the ruling by the trial court allowing each defendant three 
peremptory challenges was based upon a factual determination by the court of adverseness 
between the several defendants. A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993); Sorensen v. 
Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994); Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Although this defendant contends the trial court did not make an interpretation of law in 
awarding the peremptory challenges, to the extent that interpretation of the law is inherent in the 
awarding or granting of peremptory challenges, the standard of review for such interpretation 
is for correctness. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993); 
Bennion v. Graham Resources Inc.. 849 P.2d 569 (Utah 1993). 
POINT IH 
Mrs. Carrier's Stated Bases For Appeal Do Not Show Reversible Error. 
B. Jury instructions submitted by the trial court were not in error. 
Standard of review for examining whether the giving of jury instructions or the failure 
to give jury instructions is a non-differential examination for correction. Erickson v. Sorensen. 
877 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Stevenson. 82 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1994). 
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C. The trial court did not err in letting Newell Knight testify. 
Standard of review of challenges to a witness' testimony and his presence in the 
courtroom are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138 
(Utah 1994); State v. Wilkerson. 612 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980). The trial court has wide discretion 
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony which are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993); Rees v. Intermountain Health 
Care. Inc.. 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). 
The challenge to a civil jury trial verdict requires a substantial evidence standard and the 
appellate court views all evidence in light most favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involved a car accident between the plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier, and defendant, 
William Roger Smith. Smith's employer, Stone Carpets, was joined in the suit on the basis of 
respondeat superior and Pleasant Grove City was joined on the basis of its alleged negligence 
for not properly maintaining a stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred. 
(Amended Complaint, R. 28-34.) 
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion to limit the number of defendants' peremptory 
challenges. (R. 381.) The court denied plaintiffs motion, finding diverse interests between the 
defendants, allowing plaintiff and each defendant three peremptory challenges to the main panel 
and each party one peremptory challenge as to the alternate juror. 
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Upon completion of the trial, the jury unanimously held that plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier, had 
no cause of action. The jury found that Mrs. Carrier was sixty percent negligent; that 
defendant, Roger Smith, was forty percent negligent; and that Pleasant Grove City had zero 
negligence in the accident. The jury verdict issued on August 24, 1993. (R. 828-830.) 
On September 1, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
[Rule 50] and Motion for a New Trial [Rule 59]. (R. 860-861.) In her memorandum in 
support, plaintiff did not assert as a basis for a new trial that the trial judge had erred in granting 
each defendant separate peremptory challenges nor the denial of her Motion to Limit Defendants' 
Peremptory Challenges. Plaintiff also filed a reply memorandum in support of her motion on 
September 30, 1993, and again did not raise the issue regarding peremptory challenges. (R. 
863-886.) 
During the first part of October, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in Randle 
v. Allen. 223 Ut. Adv. Rep. 6 (Oct. 8, 1993), which addressed the issue of peremptory 
challenges when there are multiple defendants. However, the plaintiff did not bring this case 
to the district court's attention before it ruled on the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or For a New Trial. On October 29, 1993, the court entered its 
order denying plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for a 
New Trial based on the issues raised in plaintiffs motion. (R. 1008.) 
Subsequently, on November 12, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief From Order 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 60(b). (R. 1010-1011.) The 
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memorandum in support of Motion for Relief from Order Denying New Trial failed to 
acknowledge that the Motion N.O.V. and for New Trial had not included a claim regarding 
peremptory challenges. Plaintiff, as if attempting to amend her failed Rule 59 motion, cited 
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for the first time noted the Randle decision, 
arguing that the district court's original denial of plaintiffs Motion to Limit the Defendants' 
Peremptory Challenges was incorrect. (R. 1013-1024.) 
On November 24, 1993, after considering the Randle decision and respective memoranda 
and oral argument, the trial court denied plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. 1047-1048.) The 
district court stated, orally and in its order, that it had found at the time of qualifying the jury 
that there was sufficient adverseness between the defendants to justify granting each defendant 
separate peremptory challenges. Upon the denial of the Motion for Relief from Order Denying 
the Motion for New Trial, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 1036.2-1036.3.) 
In a further attempt to obtain a new trial, plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition of the Appeal on December 23, 1993, arguing that the trial court committed 
"manifest error" in denying plaintiff's motions and asking the Supreme Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of plaintiff s Motion for Relief from the Order Denying a New Trial on the basis 
of Randle v. Allen. Each of the defendants filed separate memoranda in opposition to plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Disposition of the Appeal. 
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The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs motion to summarily reverse, preferring to defer 
"ruling until plenary consideration and disposition of the case." Ruling denying Summary 
Disposition, January 10, 1994, attached as Exhibit "D". 
Defendant, Stone Carpets, insists in this brief that, not only did the trial court not err in 
denying plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion, but the trial court carefully considered and properly 
determined that the defendants were adverse parties, as required under Randle. The granting 
of peremptory challenges was therefore correct and not reversible error. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Within ten days following the rendering of the jury verdict, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial, pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not raise the issue of the granting of peremptory 
challenges to the defendants in the motion. On October 29, 1993, the trial court denied the 
combined motion. 
On November 12, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from the Order Denying the 
Motion for a New Trial under Rule 60(b). Plaintiff raised the issue of the number of 
peremptory challenges given the defendants in the Motion. The court correctly denied that 
motion on November 23, 1993. Because the Motion for Relief from the Order could not 
encompass a new issue not raised in the initial Motion for a New Trial filed within the ten day 
mandatory period, it gave no valid basis for changing the previous denial of the Motion for a 
New Trial. The court could not consider the 60(b) motion as an attempt to extend the time for 
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filing the Motion for a New Trial as it was past the jurisdictional time limit for a Motion for a 
New Trial. 
In denying the Motion for Relief from Order Denying the Motion for New Trial, the 
court pointed out that at the initial trial of this matter the court had found adequate adverseness 
between the respective defendants to comply with the decision cited in Randall v. Allen which 
had now been cited to the court. 
The trial court had before it and considered the adverseness between the respective 
defendants and correctly ruled that the adverseness entitled each defendant to three peremptory 
challenges. The court applied not only the standard set forth in Sutton v. Otis Elevator 
Company, but met the criteria of the new standard prescribed by Randall v. Allen. 
Interpretation of Rule 47(c) as urged by plaintiff and the interpretation of Randlev. Allen 
as urged by plaintiff would be in derogation of the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. (Exhibit "A" attached.) 
If the court were to adopt the strictness urged by the plaintiff, it would be a violation of 
the immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the requirement that defendants 
share peremptory challenges, would deprive the defendants of due process as guaranteed under 
the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and treats them differently than 
plaintiff as applied in this case. (Exhibit "A" attached.) 
In addition to the other constraints on the interpretation of the Rule 47(c) as urged by the 
plaintiff, the strict application of it requiring the sharing of peremptory challenges is in 
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derogation of Article I, Section 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution requiring uniform operation 
and application of the law. (Exhibit "B" attached.) The cases decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court in similar situations and supportive of defendant's interpretation are Johnson v. Stoker. 
685 P.2d 539 (1984); Malen v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (1984); Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt 
Lake. 817 P.2d 816 (1991); and Lee v. Gaufin. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (November 30, 1993). 
In addition to plaintiffs interpretation being in derogation of both the U.S. Constitution 
and Utah Constitution; the requirement for shared peremptory challenges by defendants would 
work an injustice in its application and prevent the parties from having the benefit of the counsel 
to advocate on behalf of his client only and not to acquiesce in conflicting decision making by 
other parties and counsel. 
The determination of adverseness between parties on the same side of a case is a factual 
determination to be made by the trial court in its advantaged position in being able to view all 
that has transpired or is about transpire in determining whether or not to allow defendants to 
exercise separate peremptory challenges. In this case, the trial court found substantial 
controversy between the defendants and properly allowed them separate peremptory challenges. 
The claim by William Smith that his employer Stone Carpets had instructed him to falsify 
facts pertaining to the occurrence of the accident and the conflicting testimony of Stone Carpets 
that no such conversation ever took place created hostility and animosity. Plaintiff exploited that 
hostility in calling them as early witnesses, demonstrating to the jury the conflict between their 
testimony. 
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Mrs. Carrier's complaints of the jury instruction is not borne out by the record. Plaintiff 
attempted to have the court instruct the jury exclusively on plaintiffs theory of right-of-way and 
not that which was supported in the record. The trial court correctly submitted to the jury both 
plaintiffs theory and the defendants' theory on right-of-way by paraphrasing the applicable 
statutes in a fashion that fairly presented to the jury the factual issues to be decided by the jury. 
Contrary to the assertions of Mrs. Carrier, the record shows that when plaintiff called 
the accident reconstructionist engaged by the City of Pleasant Grove as her witness, the cross-
examination was within the permissible scope of cross-examination allowed by the court and the 
complained of interpretation of the statute by Newell Knight was elicited from Mr. Knight in 
the re-direct examination by plaintiffs counsel, thus opening the door to an issue that now 
plaintiff asserts as error. The record before the court demonstrates that the question was fully 
appropriate and within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Properly Denied Mrs, Carrier's 
Rule 60(b) Motion Attempting To Add Grounds For 
Curing The Failed Rule 59 Motion For New Trial. 
A. Grant of peremptory challenges was not stated as basis of motion for new trial. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict [Rule 50] and for a 
New Trial [Rule 59], on September 1, 1993, within the 10 days required for filing said motions. 
Plaintiff asserted as grounds for such motion the unusual schedule, abuse of discretion in 
9 
admitting Newell Knight's testimony and in modifying a jury instruction, and lack of evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict, but did not assert the grant of peremptory challenges as grounds 
for said motions. 
Plaintiff did not attempt to amend her motion to include a claim of error in granting the 
full number of challenges within the 10 day period. Upon denial of the Rule 59 motion on 
October 29, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from the Order Denying the Motion for 
New Trial under Rule 60(b) on November 12, 1993. In this motion plaintiff sought relief from 
the Order Denying Motion for New Trial of October 29, 1993, "based upon a recent 
development in the law, specifically the Utah Supreme Court's ruling of Randle v. Allen. 
supra." Plaintiff claimed, for the first time since the jury rendered its verdict, that the court 
erred when it granted the full number of peremptory challenges to each party. However, since 
plaintiff had not based her Motion for New Trial on any alleged error in granting peremptory 
challenges, the trial court properly denied both the Motion for New Trial and the ensuing 
Motion for Relief from the Order Denying the Motion for New Trial. The Rule 60(b) motion 
cannot be used to reverse a denial of a Motion for a New Trial by asserting an issue (peremptory 
challenges) not raised in the underlying motion. 
B. Plaintiff cannot bring Rule 60(b) motion to extend time for amending Rule 59 
motion. 
Plaintiff first raised the issue of peremptory challenges in her pre-trial motion to limit the 
number of peremptory challenges given each defendant, and should have raised it in the Rule 
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59 Motion for New Trial if intending to rely on it. However, having failed to state the 
peremptory challenge issue as grounds for a new trial in a timely and appropriate motion, 
plaintiff attempted, in effect, to untimely amend that motion by filing the Rule 60(b) motion 
nearly twelve weeks after the jury verdict. "When such an untimely motion is made, the trial 
court's only alternative is to deny the motion." Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 
1982). By granting the Rule 60(b) motion, the trial court would have effectually extended 
plaintiffs time for filing an amended Rule 59 motion. A court may not extend the time for 
either a Rule 59 or a Rule 60(b) motion, Goddard v. Bundy. 121 Utah 299, 310, 241 P.2d 462 
I 
(1952), denial of the Rule 60(b) motion was proper. See also. Boskovich v. Utah Const. Co.. 
123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (Utah 1953) (10 day period for filing motion for new trial cannot 
be enlarged). In Goddard. appellants contended that they should be relieved of a default in the 
motion for new trial because they had filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion. The court held, 
however, that this argument was not sound, since it would wrongfully allow a Rule 60(b) motion 
to extend the time limit of Rule 59, id. at 309-10. Having unsuccessfully prevailed upon the 
trial court, and upon the Supreme Court to summarily reverse denial of this second motion, 
plaintiff appeals. 
C. Denial of Motion for Relief is within discretion of trial court. 
The granting or denying of a Rule 60(b) motion is within the "discretion of the trial court 
and will not be upset on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion." 
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While counsel for plaintiff argues in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Relief from Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial that, due to a change in law, 
relief is "in furtherance of justice," page 3, he fails to give any explanation or excuse for 
neglecting to raise the peremptory challenge issue in the Motion for a New Trial. Just as when 
bringing a motion for relief on the basis of new evidence, "the moving party must show that 'by 
due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and produced' before judgment was 
rendered," Hall, supra at 229, citing Boyce. supra at 995, plaintiff in this case should have to 
show why the issue on which the law supposedly changed could not have been brought to the 
attention of the trial court at the time the Rule 59 motion was considered. Although Randle was 
not yet decided at the time the trial court ruled on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff was 
aware of the peremptory challenge issue, having raised it in her pre-trial motion before jury 
selection began, and should have raised it in the Motion for New Trial in order to rely on it later 
in asking for relief from the court's denial of the new trial motion. 
Furthermore, in basing the motion on "new" law, plaintiff should be required to show 
that the change was of "sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there 
would have been a different result," Doty, supra at 995, as is required when basing a motion 
for relief on new evidence. In this case, there could be no such showing, since the trial court 
had already found the "substantial controversy" Randle requires to grant each defendant the full 
number of peremptory challenges. The issue of adverseness between the defendants is a factual 
issue which is examined under an abuse of discretion standard. 
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Plaintiff was aware that the trial court had granted the full number of peremptory 
challenges based on "disparate interests" (Transcript, July 15, 1993), but chose not to include 
that as a basis for the Motion for New Trial. She could not then argue that this ground could 
not have been raised before the order on the new trial motion was rendered, just because she 
was reminded of that argument when the Randle decision was rendered. In order to have taken 
advantage of that "new law", plaintiff would have had to plead the issue in her motion, or 
prevail on a motion for relief based on excusable neglect. Inasmuch as the issue was not raised 
at the time the motion for new trial was made, and plaintiff did not assert excusable neglect, the 
Randle case would not have changed the trial court's deliberation on the stated grounds for new 
trial, so the court did not abuse its discretion in the decision rendered. 
POINT H 
The Trial Court Applied The Proper Law 
In Allowing Each Adverse Co-Defendant The 
Full Number Of Peremptory Challenges. 
A. Plaintiffs reading of Randle runs counter to the more flexible rule recommended in 
Sutton, 
Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]ach party shall be 
entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of this 
rule." Subsection (c) states that "[w]here there are several parties on either side, they must join 
in a challenge before it can be made." The Utah Supreme Court has issued two opinions that 
interpret the language set forth in Rule 47(c) and its predecessor statute. 
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In the earlier of the two cases, Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co.. 69 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 
(Utah 1926), the plaintiff was injured by a defective elevator and sued the company that installed 
the elevator as well as the Bonneville Hotel where the elevator was located. At the trial level, 
the defendants each sought the same number of peremptory challenges as the plaintiff. 
However, the trial court ruled (under the statute substantially identical to the present Rule 47(c)) 
that the defendants were joint parties on the same side of the lawsuit and consequently, together 
they would only receive collectively the number of peremptory challenges as the plaintiff 
received individually. The Otis Elevator Company appealed, arguing that Bonneville Hotel and 
Otis Elevator Company were adverse parties, each entitled to their own peremptory challenges. 
Id. at 93-95. The Supreme Court in Sutton held that it was prejudicial error to require co-
defendants to exercise their peremptory challenges together when their interests are hostile and 
adverse. Id. at 141. It further explained that extra peremptory challenges should be granted to 
multiple parties if there is "a substantial controversy between them respecting the subject matter 
of the suit." IcL In its decision, the court analyzed similar cases in other jurisdictions and 
adopted the rule followed by courts in Texas, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Id. at 145. The cases 
reviewed determined there is a substantial controversy between parties when "their defenses are 
essentially different, especially when these are hostile, defendants must necessarily sever in their 
answers, and, as each has a distinct issue to maintain, we think that each is to be considered a 
[separate] party." Id at 139 citing Hundhausen v. Atkins. 36 Wisconsin 518. 
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This rule, as applied by the court to the facts in Sutton, showed that the parties were 
"hostile" to each other, that their answers were severed, that they pleaded different defenses, 
and consequently, that they were adverse parties. 
First of all, the court stated that the defendants in the case, the hotel company and the 
elevator company, filed separate answers and "were represented by separate counsel." Id at 
134. The defendants also filed answers that were materially different from each other. Id The 
court also pointed out that, while the defendants did not file a cross-claim against each other, 
there was sufficient evidence to show that the hotel company would have had an action against 
the elevator company. Id. at 135. Furthermore, throughout the litigation, the court quoted 
examples of the defendants' hostility towards each other. Id. at 135-137. Finally, the court 
stated that, in its opinion, the intent of the legislature in formulating the statute was not to adopt 
a strict construction, but instead to interpret it liberally because a strict construction would lead 
to injustice in many cases. Id at 144. Consequently, the court found a substantial controversy 
between the two parties and ruled that the trial court had committed prejudicial error by not 
allowing each party its own peremptory challenges. Id. at 145. 
More recently, the Supreme Court considered co-parties rights to separate peremptory 
challenges in Randle v. Allen, supra. In Randle. plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit against the 
Utah Department of Transportation, Salt Lake County and Carl Allen, as a result of an 
automobile accident which occurred between plaintiffs wife, Mrs. Randle, and defendant, Carl 
Allen. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that Allen negligently operated his vehicle and that 
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UDOT and Salt Lake County were negligent for design and maintenance of the intersection 
where the accident occurred. 
In Randle. the court stated that it adopted the rule set forth in Sutton. "We believe, in 
accord with Sutton, that extra peremptory challenges should be allowed only when a substantial 
controversy exists between the co-parties, (emphasis added.)" However, instead of adopting 
the analysis the court used in Sutton to determine whether there was a substantial controversy, 
the court in Randle characterized it differently, stating "that a substantial controversy exists when 
a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, 
a separate distinct lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and defendants." Id. 
at 7. The court's statement in Randle concerning what constitutes a substantial controversy 
actually cuts against the reasoning of the court in Sutton and if applied to the facts in Sutton 
would have changed the result of the Sutton court's decision. In Sutton the co-defendants did 
not file cross-claims against each other, but the court still found that their interests were 
sufficiently adverse to grant them separate peremptory challenges. Sutton. 69 Utah at 134,145. 
Furthermore, the Sutton court stated that it favored a more liberal interpretation of the statute 
and that a strict construction of the statute could lead to injustices. IcjL at 144. 
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B. The provision of Rule 47(c) requiring agreement on the exercise of peremptory 
challenges is in derogation of the United States Constitution. 
1. Equal protection under the 14th Amendment to individual defendants. 
Neither the Sutton case nor the Randle case had presented to the court the issue of 
whether or not the provision in Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or its 
predecessor statute requiring parties to join in their peremptory challenges, as applied in the 
Randle case, constitutes any violation of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution 
to the United States. In pertinent part that provision provides, 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state deprive person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws (emphasis added). 
In Raymond vs. Chicago Union Traction Co.. (1907) 207 U.S. 20, 52 L. Ed 78, 28 S. 
Ct. 7, the U.S. Supreme Court held that provisions of the 14th Amendment are not confined to 
action by the state through its legislature, but apply also to its executive and judicial authorities 
and to all instrumentalities by which the state acts by virtue of public position under state 
government. See also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles. 227 U.S. 278, 57 L. Ed 510, 33 
S. Ct. 312 (1913) (holding, "Prohibitions and guarantees of the 14th Amendment are addressed 
to, and control, not only states, but also every person, whether natural or juridical, who is 
repository of state power.") While it may be argued that the granting or denial of peremptory 
challenges of perspective jurors is not a constitutional right, it cannot be disputed that the state 
through Rule 47, having given to various parties in litigation the right to peremptory challenges, 
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must apply that state power with equality to all persons affected thereby. If the interpretation 
of Rule 47(c) effectively deprives some litigants of rights granted to other litigants in the same 
case by providing defendants only a proportionate share of peremptory challenges proportionate 
to the number of defendants in the litigation; be that one each or one challenge for three 
defendants; the application of the rule is in disharmony with the mandates of the 14th 
Amendment requiring equal protection to all persons affected thereby. 
The most limited application of the interpretation urged by plaintiff would require Stone 
Carpets and William Smith to share three peremptory challenges. Each defendant is named 
separately in the case; because of the adverseness and hostility each, under the Code of 
Professional Responsibility is required to have separate counsel; but under plaintiffs claim each 
would only have one half of the amount of peremptory challenges as plaintiff, even if they could 
agree. If they could not agree, they would be deprived of peremptory challenges entirely. 
2. An unduly restrictive basis for finding adverseness would violate the 
privileges and immunities clause. 
This defendant maintains that under Sutton and cases in surrounding jurisdictions, the 
trial court is given discretion to predicate the allocation of peremptory challenges on factual 
determinations of adverseness, not only upon the simple determination of whether the parties 
have filed cross-claims against each other. To impose such a significantly more restrictive rule 
on co-defendants in Utah, when defendants in other states stand a far better chance of being 
granted the full number of peremptory challenges, would deny Utahns their constitutional right 
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to enjoy the same privileges and immunities under the 14th Amendment as United States citizens 
in other states. 
3. A strict requirement that defendants share peremptory challenges deprives 
defendants of due process as guaranteed under the 5th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
In debating the meaning of the statutory requirement that "the parties on either side" 
share peremptory challenges, the Sutton court pointed out the possibility that a strict rule 
requiring co-defendants to share peremptory challenges "puts it in the power of the plaintiff to 
deprive the real party sought to be charged of the right to interpose even one peremptory 
challenge," 68 Utah 143. To name a defendant in a suit, and then deprive that defendant of the 
same right to challenge any of the jurors that the plaintiff may exercise, is to deny due process 
to such defendant, in derogation of the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The courts 
should not be applying a rule which deprives any party of due process in its application. 
Furthermore, denial of peremptory challenges denies a defendant of effective 
representation of an attorney, a right inherent in the concept of due process. While demographic 
studies or psychological evaluations in appropriate cases may provide insight into probable juror 
bias or inclination in appropriate cases, the short time frame between disclosure by the court of 
the panel to be called for juror examination and the limited opportunity to examine each juror 
as to the nuances of the jurors' education, work history, family relationships, kinds of 
association, reading materials and past experience, gives great importance to the exercise of 
peremptory challenges. If counsel is not allowed to challenge a juror in order to protect the 
19 
interests of the client, the client is denied effective representation and may be deprived of 
"property, without due process of law." (5th Amendment, U.S. Constitution). 
The instincts and intuitions of the party litigant and counsel for the party litigant are a 
fundamental basis for eliminating through peremptory challenges, those jurors, for any of myriad 
of reasons, believed by the party or their counsel to be disfavored towards their cause. The 
hundreds of hours of time in preparation for the defending of the case now before the court 
develops thought processes, concepts and thinking which are part of the attorney's work product 
and which are not shared with counsel for other defendants or with the court or plaintiffs 
counsel. They are part and parcel of the exercise of peremptory challenges in order to assure 
due process. 
The ethical considerations mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility requires 
the exercise of the utmost integrity on the part of the advocate attorney to exercise peremptory 
challenges in a way he or she and the client conceive are in the clients best interest in the 
litigation. These thought processes cannot be compromised in an effort to acquiesce in the 
sharing of peremptory challenges. Either a requirement to share or an outright denial of 
peremptory challenges limits the effectiveness of counsel to protect the interests of the client. 
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C. PlaintifPs argument for the application of Rule 47(c) is in derogation of Article I, 
Section 11 & 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
In neither the Sutton nor the Randle cases did the court, ruling on the issue of peremptory 
challenges, consider or discuss the requirements of Article I, Section 24, of the Utah 
Constitution which provides, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
In Stanton v. Stanton. 421 U.S. 7, 43 L Ed.2d 688, 95 S. Ct. 1373, (1975), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a state law prescribing a lower age of majority for females than males 
was discriminatory and denied equal protection of the laws in the context of child support. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Stoker. 685 P.2d 539 (1984), held that the Utah Aircraft 
guest statute violated the equal protection principles of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and was thus unconstitutional. In the analysis of Rule 47(c), the litigants should 
have presented and the Court should have considered whether or not the application of the rule 
pertaining to the exercise of peremptory challenges also constituted a violation of the state 
constitutional provision requiring all laws of a general nature to be uniform in operation. The 
issue is whether or not the application of the provisions pertaining to peremptory challenges was 
unconstitutional because it treats defendants different than plaintiffs by allowing plaintiffs three 
peremptory challenges, but requiring defendants or parties to one side to share peremptory 
challenges. This could apply in any case where there are multiple parties on one side and single 
parties or lesser number of parties on the other side. 
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In a similar case, Malen v. Lewis, supra, the Supreme Court held that the Utah 
Automobile guest statute was unconstitutional as a violation of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution for unequal application to tort victims. In Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 
817 P.2d 816 (1991), the Court held that Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution requires 
that a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. That statutory classification must 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court has 
not considered Rule 47(e) and (c) as it might be impacted by Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. In considering plaintiffs appeal, this court should consider the constitutional 
mandate as interpreted by the Supreme Court in other contexts. 
As stated in Lee v. Gaufin. supra, a law that is uniform on its face may still be 
unconstitutional under this section [Utah Constitution, Section 24], since the critical issue is 
whether the operation of the law is uniform. The law does not operate uniformly if similarly 
situated persons are not treated similarly or if persons in different circumstances are treated as 
if their circumstances were the same. The court held that a heightened standard of scrutiny 
should be applied in cases which implicated rights protected under Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution as well as under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. The following 
discussion will show that such injustice occurs through violations of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Utah Constitution and basic fairness. Defendant maintains that the operations of Rule 47(c) as 
urged by Mrs. Carrier would deprive this defendant of rights guaranteed by both sections of the 
Utah Constitution. 
22 
D. A strict rule requiring peremptory challenges to be shared would work injustice 
other than the constitutional violations. 
Plaintiffs interpretation of Randle suggesting that a trial court can find "substantial 
conflict" only when co-parties file cross-claims against one another would impose a rule that 
applies form over substance. By requiring "cross-claims" to prove adversity, the court is 
encouraging more litigation and is failing to analyze the realities of the situation that may exist 
between the two parties. Under current Utah law, employers cannot file cross-claims against 
their employees acting within the course of their employment. So by predicating the 
determination of allocating peremptory challenges on the filing of cross-claims, the Randle court 
is forcing two parties to share peremptory challenges who may have extreme hostility and 
adversity between each other and who are precluded from filing cross-claims against each other. 
The rights of either party, or of both parties, could be seriously jeopardized if they cannot agree 
on peremptory challenges. 
Considering the difficulty of applying the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court and 
approved by the legislature under Rule 47 which requires multiple defendants to join in 
peremptory challenges, a strict rule requiring all defendants to share in peremptory challenges 
could leave one or more parties without a chance to object to potentially biased perspective 
jurors. Hypothetically, if there were ten defendants named by the plaintiff, and only three 
peremptory challenges allowed for the defendants' side of the case to coincide with three 
peremptory challenges afforded the plaintiff, then seven of the ten defendants, if they could not 
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reach agreement on exercise of peremptory challenges, would be deprived of any exercise of a 
peremptory challenge. Read strictly, Rule 47(c) mandates an agreement between the parties that 
may be not only hostile to each other, but each may have a valid difference in the exercise of 
their peremptory challenges based upon each parties and that party's counsel's view of 
characteristics and perceived propensities of the particular perspective jurors. 
The problem inherent in requiring co-parties to share peremptory challenges was 
recognized in Sutton. That court explained that if the rule requiring all "parties on either side" 
to join 
means the parties on either side as the same appear in the title of the case, then in many 
cases it puts it in the power of the plaintiff to deprive the real party sought to be charged 
of the right to interpose even one peremptory challenge, much less three, which is the 
number allowed by the statute. . . . In such case the plaintiff would have his three 
challenges and the defendants none, unless they could agree. The controversy between 
the defendants in such case might be more sharp than the controversy between plaintiff 
and defendants, still they must be considered on the same side, simply because they have 
been so arranged by the plaintiff in the title of the case. (Emphasis added.) 
Sutton. 68 Utah at 142. This concern is expressed by Donald E. Evins in the annotation, Jury: 
Number of Peremptory Challenges Allowable in Civil Case Where There are More Than Two 
Parties Involved, 32 A.L.R. 3d 747, 769 & 786 citing International-Great Northern R. Co. v. 
Smith. 269 S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Citing Mourisen v. Hansen. 20 A.2d 84 (Conn. 
1941), Evins points out that when there are several plaintiffs or defendants, to require that all 
parties on one side of the case to share challenges "might mean that one or more would have 
no right of challenge at all," id., a clear injustice. 
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If the court were to impose a rule mandating that hostile parties, who would have 
opposing views of which jurors should be stricken, simply because those parties find themselves 
all named as defendants, it would be requiring the impossible. 
As in the present case, as an example, where the co-defendants had formerly been in an 
employer/employee relationship, both parties may recognize that a prospective juror, having just 
been laid off of work, is predisposed to sympathize with the fired employee and against the 
employer. If that prospective juror is not dismissed for cause, the employer would desire to use 
a peremptory challenge, yet the employee would want the juror to remain, and they would not 
be able to agree on the use of the shared peremptory challenge. "[I]t could well be that persons 
acceptable to one would be wholly unacceptable to another on the same side," Sutton, id. To 
require that hostile parties named on the same side of a case agree in order to exercise a 
challenge would be manifest injustice. 
The Rule 47(c) mandate that co-defendants must exercise peremptory challenges 
cooperatively ignores the reality that separate counsel and their clients perceive different jurors 
or different characteristics of jurors to be contrary to their best interests in the context of the 
presentation of their advocacy and without regard to the other parties perception. The mandate 
to share requires an agreement, where an agreement is not possible or where it is unfair, and 
compulsory sharing would result in not being able to exercise peremptory challenges as to those 
jurors that are the most offensive to the specific defendant, but require it to be exercised as to 
jurors that are somewhat unacceptable to both or all parties. 
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A concurrence with plaintiffs interpretation of the Randall decision in applying it to 
multi-defendant cases would result in an inequity to each individual defendant. If plaintiff is to 
have three peremptory challenges and four defendants are to share three peremptory challenges 
does one of the four get three and the other three get none or three of the defendants get one 
each and one defendant have none. This inequality is even more severe than the claimed 
inequality asserted by the plaintiff because the plaintiff in the action elected to bring suit against 
all three defendants. Plaintiff could have brought suit against Stone Carpet and Pleasant Grove 
who had admittedly adverse interests and restricted the defendants to three peremptory challenges 
each or plaintiff could have commenced suit against the driver only. It was the plaintiff 
denominating three separate defendants that foreshadowed the necessity of each defendant being 
given their own peremptory challenges. 
Plaintiff argues that the plaintiff is put at a disadvantage if all defendants are given the 
full number of peremptory challenges, since the cumulative number of challenges of defendants 
exceeds the number of challenges plaintiff may exercise. However, by choosing to name several 
defendants in one suit, the plaintiff has created this disadvantage for herself. 
There are independent issues in view of the statutory prohibition in §78-27-40, Utah Code 
Annotated, which in pertinent part provides, "No defendant is entitled to contribution from any 
other person." Thus, the application of a restrictive rule which requires that a substantive cross-
claim must be the predicate to a request for separate peremptory challenges may be the very 
basis for the concern of the Sutton court, at page 144, when it adopted a more liberal 
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interpretation of the statute and warned that a strict construction of the statute could lead to 
injustices. 
Also, with the decreasing incentive to file cross claims, a "substantial conflict" rule based 
on whether or not a cross-claim was filed would be unduly constraining. In 1986, the Utah 
legislature repealed the statute providing for contribution among joint tort-feasors in tort cases, 
significantly diminishing the incentive for a co-defendant to file a cross-claim and rendering the 
filing of cross-claims almost non-existent. Instead of couching a rule in terms of complying with 
a procedural requirement, that of filing a cross-claim, the court should adopt the rule that it 
applied in the Sutton case, where it looked at substance over form and set guidelines in 
determining whether parties' interests were truly adverse to one another. That decision also 
recognized the necessity of the trial court, who could exercise a "hands-on" evaluation, 
exercising its discretion in determining adverseness. 
E. Defendant's interpretation of Randle as the clear case illustration is more consistent 
with previous and surrounding law. 
Plaintiff, interpreting Randle. suggests that "[i]n order for the trial court to award more 
than one set of peremptory challenges to a side, the co-parties must file cross-claims against each 
other," Brief of Appellant, page 15. To attribute such a conclusive and short-sighted holding 
to Randle, however, would be to hyper-extend, if not completely misconstrue, its significance. 
If Plaintiffs interpretation of Randle were adopted, it would establish a rule requiring that 
Sutton, which Randle cites as the authority for the "significant controversy" rule, Randle. at 
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1332, be overturned. Furthermore, it would run counter to the great weight of jurisprudence 
in surrounding jurisdictions. 
Plaintiff apparently takes his interpretation of Randle from the Supreme Court's 
declaration that, in its view, 
a 'substantial controversy' exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-claim 
against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, distinct lawsuit from the action 
existing between the plaintiffs and defendants. 
Counsel for Defendant Stone Carpets suggests that while this statement identifies the clear case 
of when parties are positioned adversely, it does not restrict the trial judge from considering 
other significant facts in each case to determine whether a party is adverse or whether 
"substantial controversy" exists. 
The Supreme Court did not state that "a 'substantial controversy' only exists" in the 
situation where cross-claims are filed. Instead, it appears to be identifying a case where there 
is little doubt that a substantial controversy exists. This determination was sufficient to decide 
Randle under its specific facts, since there was a distinct and formal cross-claim between 
defendants therein. Consistent with a policy of limiting a court's ruling to the case being 
decided, the Supreme Court could have decided that case clearly without having to expound a 
more general rule that would decide in advance any future cases that might arise under less 
conclusive facts, such as the case here on review. 
That the court in Sutton found sufficient evidence of "substantial controversy" between 
the defendants although "a cross-claim was not filed in the case by the hotel company against 
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the elevator company," Sutton, at 135, suggests that plaintiffs reading of Randle does not reflect 
the extent of the law in Utah. Just as "the mere fact that appellant and the hotel company were 
joined as defendants in the action is not conclusive that they were on the same side within the 
meaning of the above statutes," 68 Utah at 134, the mere fact that a cross-claim was not filed 
is not conclusive that no substantial controversy exists. To so hold would require overturning 
Sutton, and the Supreme Court expressed no such intent in Randle. Rather, it seemed to rely 
on the law as set forth in Sutton, since it cited it frequently, Randle. 862 P.2d at 1332-33. 
To arrive at the result asserted by plaintiff, this court would have to find either that in 
deciding Randle the Supreme Court overruled Sutton or it did not carefully consider the facts 
giving rise to that earlier decision. An easier and more plausible explanation of the Randle 
statement concerning cross-claims is that the Supreme Court was stating a clear rule that would 
decide that particular case, and was not preventing trial courts from considering all factors 
indicating adverse status of co-parties in cases yet to come. 
There is some indication in Randle that the Supreme Court found limited discretion on 
the part of a trial judge in Utah to find substantial controversy "simply because [the co-parties'] 
defenses or claims rested on different facts," Randle. at 1333. However, the Court's brief 
disposition of several cases from other jurisdictions on the basis that it "[did] not find that degree 
of discretion built into subsection (c) of Rule 47" not only imposes a far stricter rule in Utah 
than in neighboring jurisdictions, but also goes far beyond the Sutton determination of 
"substantial controversy," requiring something more like "extreme controversy." 
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F. Determination of adverseness for purposes of allocating peremptory challenges 
involves more factual determinations than only whether cross-claims have been filed. 
The "more liberal rule" recommended in Sutton, and followed in several jurisdictions, 
recognizes the unique advantage of the trial judge in determining the nature of the various claims 
and the adversity of the parties. The trial judge is in the best position to assess conflicting 
interests, to decide whether they constitute "substantial conflict" in the case at bar, and should 
therefore be given discretion beyond merely determining whether a formal cross-claim was filed. 
In the case now on appeal, the trial court recognized early in the case that substantial 
conflict had arisen to the degree that defendants sought separate counsel, filed separate answers, 
and would view prospective jurors differently. The trial court determined that each should 
receive the same number of peremptory challenges. Plaintiffs presentation of evidence 
attempted to dramatize and discredit the individual defendants, and her emphasis on the claimed 
hostility and alleged lying by both the employer and employee, dramatized the adverseness 
between Smith and his former employer, and confirmed the correctness of the trial court's 
decision that the parties were sufficiently adverse to warrant peremptory challenges to each. 
Subsequent argument at trial, including plaintiffs vigorous exploitation of the controversy, see 
Transcript, Vol. II-R. 1312, copy attached as Exhibit "E", affirmed that in making this decision 
the trial court had been sensitive to the various interests involved in the case, had foreseen the 
parties' adverse positions, and had ruled appropriately under the given circumstances. 
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Other jurisdictions recognize the special vantage point of the trial judge, and the judge's 
discretion in determining the extent of adversity among parties and in granting peremptory 
challenges. For instance, in Texas, when 
considering the number of peremptory challenges to be allocated between the 
litigants or sides, the trial court must determine, based on the information gleaned 
from pleadings, pre-trial discovery, and representation made during voir dire 
examination, what antagonism, if any, exists between the parties. 
Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt. 718 S.W. 2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986). 
This determination of antagonism is based on the cumulative proceedings, not just on the filing 
of a cross-claim. Similarly, in New Mexico, the trial court may consider several factors in 
determining adversity, including 
1) whether the parties employed the same attorneys; 2) whether separate answers were 
filed; 3) whether the parties interests were antagonistic; and, 4) in a negligence claim, 
whether different independent acts of negligence are alleged in a suit governed by 
comparative negligence. 
Carraro v. Wells Fargo Mtg. & Equity. 744 P.2d 915, 918 (N.M. App. 1987). In determining 
diversity of claims, the court must rely on the pleadings and assertions of the parties, id. "This 
determination of a preliminary question rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion," id., citing Morris v. Cartwright. 258 P.2d 
719 (N.M. App. 1953). 
The Supreme Court in Randle, while discounting cases from states in which "courts have 
been more liberal," Randle, at 1333, in an apparent attempt to establish a rule in Utah granting 
less discretion to the trial judge, failed to recognize that the "more liberal rule" championed in 
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Sutton suggests that Utah law on peremptory challenges is not, or should not be, so different 
from that applied in other states. 
G. The trial court found substantial controversy between defendants and properly 
allowed the full number of peremptory challenges. 
Analysis of the facts of the case on appeal in light of Sutton and Randle shows that, in 
the interest of justice, the defendants here are individually entitled to their own peremptory 
challenges under Rule 47(c). 
In Sutton, where the plaintiff filed suit against the elevator company and the hotel where 
the elevator was located, the court demonstrated that the defendants' interests were adverse by 
showing that they had filed separate answers, retained separate counsel, presented significant 
variations in their answers, and their interests were hostile to each other. Furthermore, the court 
indicated that even though the defendants had filed no cross-claims against each other, it was 
sufficient to show that if a judgment was entered against one party, it may present a substantial 
cause of action against the other party. Id. at 135. 
Applying those facts to this case shows that the defendants here were entitled to separate 
peremptory challenges. In this case different counsel represented Stone Carpets, its former 
employee, Roger Smith, and Pleasant Grove City. While it is true that initially Mr. Jeffs 
represented both Stone Carpets and Roger Smith, it was precisely because of the adverse 
interests and lack of cordial understanding that Mr. Jeffs withdrew from representing Mr. Smith 
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and new counsel appeared for him. At that point, if not earlier, the parties' separate interests 
and the hostility that existed between them became apparent. 
Roger Smith was an employee of Stone Carpets and was the driver of the vehicle that 
was involved in the accident. At first, he and Stone Carpets were represented by the same 
counsel, M. Dayle Jeffs. However as the case progressed, Mr. Smith requested new counsel 
because of allegations on his part that his former employer, Stone Carpets, requested him to 
"lie" concerning the facts of the accident. At the commencement of the trial, the plaintiff called 
Mr. Smith and Mr. Stone as his first two witnesses and dramatically brought out to the jury the 
hostility that existed between them due to Mr. Smith's assertion that Joe Stone of Stone Carpets, 
met with him after the accident and told him to misrepresent to the investigators the 
circumstances of the accident. See trial testimony of Roger Smith, (copy attached as Exhibit 
"F"). 
However, Joe Stone denies ever having had the alleged conversation with Roger Smith. 
Specifically in trial testimony, he denies ever meeting with Mr. Smith and ever asking him to 
change his story about the circumstances surrounding the accident. It is unlikely that Mr. Stone 
would encourage misrepresentation of that sort since it would negatively affect his interests. 
Obviously, these two parties have truly adverse interests in the case and since both were 
accusing the other of lying about what happened, it would have been impossible for both Roger 
Smith's and Stone Carpets' interests to have been protected if they had to share counsel or their 
peremptory challenges. 
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H. Plaintiff admitted that interests of Pleasant Grove City were adverse, and court 
determined interests of other defendants to be adverse to each other as well. 
Counsel for plaintiff has admitted that the interests of Pleasant Grove City were adverse 
to the interests of the other defendants. See first page of Transcript, July 15, 1993, attached to 
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 2, in which Mr. Harris declares "I clearly will not dispute Pleasant 
Grove City has disparate interests..." Nevertheless, a brief discussion will emphasize that the 
other parties defendant had "disparate interests" and were indeed adverse to one another. 
The plaintiffs theory that Pleasant Grove City was negligent because it failed to discover 
and replace a missing stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred is completely 
different from the theory alleged against Roger Smith and Stone Carpets. Consequently, the 
defenses used by Pleasant Grove City were completely different than those used by Stone 
Carpets or Roger Smith. Thus, Pleasant Grove City is in a very similar position to the 
defendant, Mr. Allen in Randle. The plaintiffs theory of negligence against Mr. Allen was 
brought on a totally different basis than it was against the other two defendants. The Supreme 
Court ruled that Mr. Allen was sufficiently adverse from the other defendants to be entitled to 
separate peremptory challenges. Randle. 223 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. Even under the stricter of 
"substantial controversy" indicated in Randle. the interests of Pleasant Grove City and the other 
defendants are clearly adverse. 
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The Randle court stated at page 7, 
To avoid favoring one side of a lawsuit over another, a trial judge must carefully 
appraise the degree of adverseness among co-parties and determine whether that 
adverseness truly warrants giving that side more challenges than the other. 
In the case at bar, the court did exactly that and in denying plaintiffs Motion From Relief From 
the Order denying plaintiffs Motion for Judgment N.O.V. and for New Trial, the court 
specifically stated that at the time it ruled on plaintiffs pre-trial motion to limit defendants' 
peremptory challenges, the court had determined that there was sufficient adverseness to 
necessitate granting each defendant separate peremptory challenges under Rule 47. See second 
page of pre-trial Transcript, July 15, 1993 attached to this brief as Exhibit "2", in which court 
finds that "by the nature of the case" the defendants' interests were sufficiently adverse to 
warrant granting each the full number of peremptory challenges. 
Where the court has carefully considered the factual issue of adverseness and made a 
specific ruling as to the adverseness of the respective defendants, this court should defer to the 
trial court's factual determination and affirm the denial of plaintiff s motion under an abuse of 
discretion standard. The record and factual determinations adequately support the trial court's 
decision and preclude a determination that the grant of three plus one peremptory challenges was 
on abuse of discretion. 
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I. The falsified claim against Stone Carpets by defendant Smith destroyed any entente 
cordiale. 
Following discharge of Mr. Smith by Stone Carpets these two defendants were in fact 
antagonistic. The asserted perjurious contention by defendant Smith that his former employer 
had encouraged him to make a false statement to the court destroyed the cordial understanding 
considered by some courts in determining controversy between parties. See, e.g.. Donald E. 
Evins, Annotation, Jury: Number of Peremptory Challenges Allowable in Civil Case Where There 
are More Than Two Parties Involved, 32 A.L.R. 3d 747, 769 & 786 citing International-Great 
Northern R. Co. v. Smith. 269 S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (apparent entente cordiale 
between defendants cited as justifying requirement that they share peremptory challenges). This 
lack of friendly understanding put the defendants in the position of "hostile" adverse parties for 
whom it would be an impossible task to compel agreement on shared peremptory challenges. 
It was therefore appropriate that each be given an equal number of challenges. 
POINT m 
Mrs. Carrier's Stated Bases For Appeal 
Do Not Show Reversible Error 
Mrs. Carrier raises several issues that have been carefully reviewed by the trial court not 
only in the Memoranda in Support of the Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New 
Trial, but also in the hearing on the Motion for Relief from Order denying Motion for New 
Trial. 
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A. Negligence of Pleasant Grove not addressed herein. 
Mrs. Carrier argument that the jury erred in finding that Pleasant Grove City was not 
negligent in this case will not be addressed herein by defendant Stone Carpets since that issue 
is not germane to defendant Stone Carpets. 
B. Jury instructions submitted by the trial court were not in error. 
In Point III of Appellant's Brief p. 24, Mrs. Carrier asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to give the right-of-way jury instruction offered by plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier. The 
standard of review for the claim of error in giving of jury instructions was stated in State v. 
Carter. 256 UAR Rep. 3, 17, where the court said: 
Whether a trial court correctly refused to give a particular jury instruction as a 
question of law. Accordingly, we grant no particular deference to the trial 
court's ruling. James. 819 P.2d at 798 (citing Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 
(Utah 1989)). As we stated in James . . . "'the trial court is not required to give 
any requested jury instruction if it does not comport with the facts or does not 
accurately state the applicable law.'" 
This defendant agrees that each party is entitled to have its theory presented to the jury, 
but not to the exclusion of the opposite parties theory. Mrs. Carrier has failed to marshall the 
evidence most supportive of the verdict and to demonstrate the inadequacy of the instruction 
given. Mrs. Carrier asserts on p. 25 of their brief, the evidence presented by Mrs. Carrier and 
her expert witness, Rudolph Limpert, in which he purports the evidence shows that the parties 
entered the intersection approximately at the same time. He fails to address or provide the court 
with the testimony supportive of the instruction and the verdict. 
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The testimony of Thomas Blotter, the accident reconstruction expert engaged by Stone 
Carpets, placed the plaintiff 126 feet from the point of impact at the time Stone Carpets' 
employee entered the intersection. (Transcript, Vol. VII-R. 2215-2217.) (Exhibit "G" 
attached.) 
The testimony of Newell Knight, the accident reconstruction expert engaged by the City 
of Pleasant Grove, said the evidence showed that Stone Carpets' employee, William Smith 
entered the intersection first. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2478:15-18.) (Exhibit "H" attached.) 
The eye witness, Arlin Shupe, testified that at the time William Smith entered the 
intersection, he saw the plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier a substantial distance from the intersection in his 
view between the house and the pine tree. (Transcript, Vol. III-R. 1666.) (Exhibit "I" 
attached.) Thus, the testimony of the eye witness and the expert witnesses presented a fact issue 
for the jury to decide on whether or not Smith entered the intersection clearly first or whether 
they entered it at approximately the same time. 
Plaintiff requested her jury instruction No. 19, which was an instruction in part taken 
from Utah Code Annotated 46-6-72(2), which only presented that portion of the statute which 
addressed the issue of whether or not the drivers entered the intersection at approximately the 
same time, but included an additional paragraph creating a presumption of negligence, copy 
attached as Exhibit J. (R. 597.) 
Stone Carpets initially submitted its jury instruction No. 45, copy attached as Exhibit K. 
(R. 702.) This instruction presented Stone Carpets theory and its evidence recited above by the 
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witnesses that Mr. Smith entered the intersection first and the instruction was taken from 46-6-
72(1) verbatim. 
The City of Pleasant Grove requested in its instruction No. 36 (R. 646, copy attached 
as Exhibit L), in which it paraphrased both facets of the Title 41-6-72, (1) and (2). 
Thereafter, Stone Carpets submitted its supplemental instruction No. 55 which gave the 
provisions of 41-6-72(1) and 41-6-72(2) verbatim. (R. 553, copy attached as Exhibit M.) 
The court elected to give instruction No. 31, which was an adaptation of the statutory 
provisions and of the City of Pleasant Grove's instruction. (R. 781, copy attached as Exhibit 
N.) (A copy of 41-6-72 is attached as Exhibit "D".) Thus, the court presented to the jury both 
the plaintiffs theory on who had the right-of-way as supported by her expert witness and her 
own testimony and the defendant's theory who had the right-of-way at the intersection supported 
by the testimony of the eye witness, Arlin Shupe, Stone Carpets' expert witness, Dr. Thomas 
Blotter and the City of Pleasant Grove's expert witness (called by plaintiff), Newell Knight. 
As stated by this court in Erickson v. Sorensen. 882 P.2d 144 at 155: 
While plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to give two specific 
instructions, '[w]e review jury instructions in there entirety and will affirm when 
the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the case.'" State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). 
The appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that a party cannot object to jury 
instructions unless at the time of trial they objected to them. 
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With regard to plaintiffs jury instruction No. 19, it is instructive that the "objections" 
raised by plaintiffs counsel is recorded in the Transcript R. 2532:24 and continuing on to R. 
2533, wherein counsel states in line 7, "In essence, my instruction was given" she objected to 
failure to include the final paragraph on her requested instruction No. 19, which is not the 
statement of the law. Exhibit "O" attached. 
Again, with regard to the instruction given the so called objection to instruction No. 31 
shown in the Transcript R. 2538:2-10, wherein counsel said, "This is the one right-of-way 
instruction which does not take the exact language of the statute. It combines both of the 
potentially applicable statutes in to one. It again uses-reduces it to prose . . . it nevertheless 
could be done more accurately, more clearly done for the jury if it was broken into two 
instructions and use the statute itself." Exhibit "P" attached. 
The trial court had before it the exact wording of both parts of the applicable statute in 
Stone Carpets instruction No. 55, attached herewith as Exhibit M, R. 558. The court elected, 
rather than give the full statute verbatim requiring the jury to interpret and apply all of the 
subparts to the statute, to paraphrase it as related to the facts presented in this case presenting 
both plaintiffs theory and defendant's theory of the right-of-way issues. As such, the trial court 
fairly represented the theories of the respective parties, and when viewed as a whole together 
with the instructions on negligence and approximate cause, fairly presented to the jury a correct 
statement of the law. It was not error to give the instruction as the court did. 
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Under Utah law, the key to determining whether a jury instruction is so improper as to 
be grounds for reversible error is "if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party." Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 1991) citing 
Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.. 774 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989). In the case on appeal 
the jury instruction paraphrasing the whole statute was less misleading to the jury than the 
instruction citing only a part of the statute submitted by Mrs. Carrier would have been. Since 
Mrs. Carrier jury instruction was incorporated into an instruction blending the legal theories of 
both parties, the substitution of Mrs. Carrier's jury instruction was not prejudicial to Mrs. 
Carrier, and therefore not reversible error. 
C. The trial court did not err in letting Newell Knight testify. 
1. Testimony of Mr. Knight was necessary to clarify deposition excerpts. 
Mrs. Carrier claims that by allowing Newell Knight, an expert retained by counsel for 
the City of Pleasant Grove and originally deposed by plaintiff, to be present and explain his 
deposition when Mrs. Carrier's counsel only desired to read portions of Mr. Knight's deposition 
out of context, the court committed reversible error. This argument fails to recognize that the 
trial court allowed Mrs. Carrier's counsel to read all of the sections he desired to introduce from 
the Knight deposition, (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2440:1-5.), but in response to an objection as to 
the foundation of Mr. Knights testimony, the court called Mr. Knight as a witness, apparently 
to avoid misrepresentation of his statements. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2439.) 
41 
Counsel for Mrs. Carrier asserts that the production of Mr. Knight was procured over 
his objection. That is not accurate. Mrs. Carrier's counsel suggested the reading of selected 
parts of Mr. Knight's deposition and when that was objected to, the Court informed all parties 
that Mr. Knight would have to be present and then Mrs. Carrier's counsel could use the 
deposition as he saw fit. Mrs. Carrier was therefore able to introduce the desired statements 
from the deposition, yet defendants were able to show those statements in the context of the 
entire deposition, as they would have been under Rule 32, which provides that depositions may 
be used only "so far as permissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness 
were then present and testifying." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 32. 
Under this rule, defendant would have been able to read portions of the deposition to 
show the foundation and context of Mr. Knight's responses as read by plaintiff. However, since 
Mr. Knight was available to testify, and apparently to avoid the difficult application of the 
somewhat artificial standard for admitting deposition testimony "as though the witness were 
there," the court instead required Mr. Knight to be present. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2439.) 
Considering that a jury is better able to understand the statements being presented when the 
witness can be cross-examined, the introduction of testimony to explain statements from a 
deposition minimizes the chance that a jury will be misled. Mr. Knight's testimony was the best 
evidence of his opinion as to the actual events contributing to the accident. The decision of the 
trial court to have Mr. Knight present assisted the jury in determining the facts of the accident, 
without giving legal conclusions as to who was negligent, and should be sustained. 
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Mrs. Carrier insinuates that because City of Pleasant Grove had listed Mr. Knight as its 
witness, but had opted not to call him to testify, it had "attempted to hide him from the jury," 
Brief of Appellant at 28. This argument is particularly ironic now that plaintiff, having 
introduced Mr. Knight's testimony herself, is asserting that testimony as grounds for a reversal. 
Once Mrs. Carrier chose to call Mr. Knight, Defendants were entitled to cross-examine him, 
and when Mrs. Carrier perceived, after the fact, that Mr. Knight's testimony had not advanced 
her case, she claimed error, and would now have the testimony "hidden." 
2. Cross-examination addressed foundation for testimony and matters on direct 
examination. 
Mrs. Carrier asserts in her Statement of Facts that defendant Stone Carpets' cross-
examination "invited Mr. Knight to interpret Utah law," Brief of Appellant at 11, and cites to 
the Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2477:21-23 as evidence thereof. An examination of the transcript, 
however, shows that this assertion is inaccurate. Counsel for Stone Carpets initially cross-
examined Mr. Knight (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2472-2478, Exhibit "H" attached). There were 
no questions asked on cross-examination of Mr. Knight asking him to interpret the traffic code 
or any statute. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Jeffs questioned Mr. Knight to set a foundation for his 
opinion as to who had the right-of-way, based on who entered the intersection first. (Transcript, 
Vol. X-R. 2476-77.) Mr. Jeffs did not refer to a statute or ask Mr. Knight to interpret it. In 
response to the question as to who, in his opinion, had the right-of-way, Mr. Knight stated 
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merely "Mr. Smith did. He got there first." (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2478.) This answer 
reflects that he based his response on the events of the accident, and was not reading nor 
interpreting Utah law. In truth, the statute was never discussed until Mr. Harris, counsel for 
Mrs. Carrier, brought it out in re-direct examination. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2479:12-21.) 
Through several episodes of voir dire and cross-examination, counsel for Stone Carpets 
questioned Mr. Knight in order to lay the proper foundation for the testimony he was giving a 
response to plaintiffs direct examination. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2472-78, 2484-85, 2493-96.) 
This examination elicited Mr. Knight's opinion as to who arrived at the intersection first, and 
did not mention the statute until plaintiffs counsel, in his re-direct examination, inquired of Mr. 
Knight of his interpretation of the applicable traffic code provisions on right-of-way at an 
intersection. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2479-2484.) 
Plaintiffs counsel called Mr. Knight as his witness, elicited the colloquy on the 
interpretation of the statute and now complains of the results of that inquiry, including the 
further cross-examination of issues raised by his own re-direct examination. Defendant's line 
of questioning in initial cross-examination and Mr. Knight's response shows that the opinion 
given by Mr. Knight was based upon his assessment of specific occurrences at the time of the 
accident rather than on an interpretation of law. The cross-examination of Mr. Knight, 
therefore, did not exceed the scope of direct. 
The approach followed in Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 1991), 
cited by Mrs. Carrier as requiring the exclusion of legal conclusions, would not restrict the line 
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of questioning conducted by Mr. Jeffs in the case on appeal. In Davidson, the same expert was 
retained to testify of circumstances surrounding an accident in which a cattle truck overturned. 
As an expert witness, "Knight was allowed to testify as to everything except his final conclusion 
that defendant was negligent." I(L at 1231. 
Mr. Knight was allowed to give his opinion as to, inter alia, the reason appellee's 
truck overturned while going around a curve, that the truck was traveling too fast 
for the curve, what the speed limit was at the curve, whether a person hauling 
livestock should be concerned with his load and what the concerns should be, and 
whether a person hauling livestock could foresee the possibility of injury if the 
truck overturned. Indeed, the only evidence the trial court excluded was Knight's 
conclusion regarding whether appellee was negligent. 
Id. Mr. Knight's testimony in that case was not unlike his testimony in this one, in that he 
responded to questions concerning the specific events and circumstances of the accident. He was 
not questioned as to legal conclusions of who was negligent. Rather, that decision was left to 
the jury. 
The Davidson case is also helpful in identifying the standard of review when an expert 
testifies: 
In reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, we give deference to the trial 
court's advantageous position, and do not overturn the result unless it is clear the 
trial court erred. See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 
923 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.) ("It 
is generally held that the trial court has discretion to determine the suitability of 
expert testimony in a case."), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Davidson. 813 P.2d at 1230. This deference to the trial court is necessary because, as Davidson 
points, "[t]here is no bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that 
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call for overbroad legal responses," id. In the 1990 case, Whitehead v. American Motor Sales 
Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
The proper scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse. 
The trial judge is in the best position to assess whether testimony should be allowed or excluded. 
The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328, rejected the argument 
that the opinion of an expert invades the province of the jury. The Court stated: 
The old shibboleth that an expert should not be permitted to invade the province 
of the jury has been largely displaced by recognition that opinions, if based on 
adequate foundation, are helpful and that the powerful tool of cross-examination 
and the jury's good judgment are sufficient to place the opinion in proper 
perspective. 
The court went on to say: 
That of course, is not to say that the jury, with its own common sense, and the 
assistance of penetrating cross-examination, cannot adequately evaluate that 
opinion in light of alternative explanations, the degree to which the opinion 
reasonable follows from the facts, and all other relevant considerations. 
The admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence depends in large measure 
upon the foundation laid. 
In this case, the foundation that was laid to show that Mr. Knight has vast experience 
with the Utah Highway Patrol, as an accident reconstructionist, and learned accident 
investigator, qualified him to render opinion as to the right-of-way and as to who entered the 
intersection first. 
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Mrs. Carrier intended to "introduce the deposition of Defendants' own witness, Newell 
Knight" to impeach defendants' case. (Brief of Appellant p. 28.) In fact, Mr. Harris had taken 
Mr. Knight's deposition and knew that Mr. Knight's opinion was that Mr. Smith entered the 
intersection first. (Excerpts of the Deposition of Newell Knight are attached hereto marked 
Exhibit "Q" and by reference made a part hereof.) Use of portions of the deposition to indicate 
otherwise would be misleading, which was the basis of Mr. Jeffs' objection to just reading 
selected parts of the deposition when Mr. Knight was available to explain his answers to the 
questions asked by Mr. Harris. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2438:24-25, 2439:1-4.) Therefore, the 
trial court acted properly in allowing Mr. Knight to testify. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2439:5-6.) 
Mrs. Carrier's characterization of Newell Knight as a "rebuttal witness" is highly 
debatable. Mr. Harris called Mr. Knight and read those parts of the deposition which he 
believed would be corroborative of the testimony given earlier by Mr. Limpert, Mrs. Carrier's 
expert. Mr. Knight's testimony only confirmed, however, that Mr. Limpert's computations 
were correct, but contradicted the factual determinations from those computations as to who 
arrived in the intersection first. Even before his direct examination was complete, the voir dire 
examination demonstrated that Mr. Knight was not a rebuttal witness at all but was intended to 
be corroborative of Mrs. Carrier's case in chief and Mrs. Carrier's expert. Mrs. Carrier, 
realizing that Mr. Knight's testimony did not had this intended effect, now appeals on the ground 
he should not have been allowed to testify, though it was Mrs. Carrier's counsel himself who 
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brought in Mr. Knight's deposition. The realization by Mrs. Carrier that Mr. Knight's 
testimony did not ultimately promote her case as she anticipated is not grounds for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Co-defendants in a lawsuit have the right to separate peremptory challenges if their 
interest are sufficiently adverse to one another. A close examination of the facts in this case 
compared with the facts of the Sutton and Randle cases show that the defendants here have 
sufficient adversity to be entitled to separate peremptory challenges. In addition, the 
constitutional issues raised herein should not be ruled upon without full briefing and 
consideration by the entire court. Accordingly, defendant, Stone Carpets, respectfully requests 
that this court deny plaintiffs motion for summary disposition. 
DATED and signed this j 2 / ^day of February, 1995. 
M. Dayle JefJ?7 ^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
Pro-Tech Restoration 
dba Stone Carpets 
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EXHIBIT A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
EXHIBIT B 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec. 11. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Sec. 24. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
EXHIBIT C 
ARTICLE 9 
RIGHT-OF-WAY 
41-6-72- Right-of-way between vehicles — Unregulated in-
tersection. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection not regulated by 
an official traffic-control device shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle that 
has entered the intersection from a different highway. 
(2) Except as specified in Subsections (3) and (4), when more than one 
vehicle enters or approaches an intersection from different highways at ap-
proximately the same time and the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic-control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic-control signal is inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, the operator of the 
vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right 
unless otherwise directed by a peace officer. 
(3) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection not regulated by 
an official traffic-control device, from a highway that does not continue be-
yond the intersection, shall yield the right-of-way to the operator of any vehi-
cle on the intersecting highway. 
(4) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection not regulated by 
an official traffic-control device, from a highway that is not paved, shall yield 
the right-of-way to the operator of any vehicle on a paved intersecting high-
way. 
EXHIBIT D 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
January 10, 1994 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
Shirley Carrier, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
Pro-Tech Restoration dba 
Stone Carpets, William 
Roger Smith, and Pleasant 
Grove City, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Plaintiff's motion to summarily reverse is this day 
denied, and the court defers its ruling until plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case, Utah R. App. P. 
10(f). 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
~"2D 
JAN 1 1 199$ 
JEFFS a JEFFS 
No. 930579 
910400680 
EXHIBIT E 
VOL II-Doc.# 1312 
PROCEDURES. 
I GET A PHONE CALL LAST WEEK FROM MR. CHIPMAN 
THAT SAID: I'M GOING TO BE FAXING YOU SOMETHING TODAY. 
WE FOUND SOMETHING. I'M INTERESTED ENOUGH TO ASK 
MR. FRYE AND MR. CARTER WHY ALL OF A SUDDEN A WEEK 
BEFORE TRIAL I'M GIVEN THIS DOCUMENT. I DON'T KNOW THE 
ANSWER TO THAT. I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT. BUT 
IT IS CLEAR FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE IN THIS 
SITUATION, FROM MR. STONE AND MR. SMITH, POINTING THEIR 
FINGERS AT EACH OTHER, ONE SAYING YOU TOLD ME A LIE, THE 
OTHER SAYING YOU'RE A LIAR, AND THEN YOU HAVE PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY THAT IS LESS THAN STELLAR IN CARRYING OUT AN 
INVESTIGATION SO WE COULD HAVE SOME ANSWERS. ONE OF 
THESE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATORS IS GOING TO SAY IT SURE 
WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO HAVE SOME PHOTOGRAPHS OR 
MEASUREMENTS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO HAVE A RESTING 
PLACE TO FIGURE OUT WHAT'S GONE ON. THEY'RE GOING TO 
HAVE TO TAKE VERSIONS OF WHO SAID WHAT, WHAT VERSIONS 
WERE WHERE, AND TRY AND PIECE TOGETHER WHAT THE SPEEDS 
OF THESE VEHICLES ARE. AND LET ME TALK ABOUT THAT FOR A 
MINUTE. 
DR. LIMPERT IS GOING TO TELL YOU, AS I 
SAID -- LET ME STRIKE THAT AND BACK UP. AS I'VE TOLD 
YOU, IT HAS BEEN A CONCERTED EFFORT OF MR. SMITH AND 
STONE CARPETS ON DAY ONE TO PLACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
EXHIBIT F 
VOL III-Doc.# 1517 
Q. WHEN DID THAT PURCHASE BEGIN; WAS IT BEFORE 
JHE COLLISION OR AFTER THE COLLISION? 
A. JULY 1ST. 
Q. SO YOU ONLY HAD LIKE THREE OR FOUR DAYS? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. IT WAS A SITUATION WHERE HE WAS GOING TO SELL 
YOU THIS CAR AND JUST TAKE OUT PAYMENTS OVER TIME? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. SO YOU DIDN'T HAVE THE CAR VERY LONG BEFORE 
IT GOT WRECKED? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. NOW, YOU SAY THAT THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE 
IN A CONFERENCE ROOM AT STONE CARPETS WITH JOE AND JIM 
PRESENT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WERE YOU THE ONLY OTHER EMPLOYEE PRESENT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. AND IT WAS IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE UPCOMING 
INVESTIGATION; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WHAT WERE YOU TOLD BY MR. STONE? 
A. TO SAY THAT WHEN — I SLOWED DOWN TO LOOK 
THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. WHEN I PROCEEDED TO GO 
THROUGH THE INTERSECTION THE VAN STALLED AND IT SLOWLY 
WENT THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. IT DIDN'T START BACK UP. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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AND MS. CARRIER CAME UP THE HILL AND WRECKED INTO ME. 
MR. JEFFS: I'M GOING TO MOVE TO STRIKE THE 
ANSWER AS NOT RELEVANT AND NOT PROBATIVE. IT HAS NO 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE THINGS AT ISSUE AND CERTAINLY IS NOT 
FOR IMPEACHMENT. 
THE COURT: I'LL PERMIT IT TO REMAIN. 
Q (BY MR. HARRIS) DID HE TELL YOU WHY HE 
WANTED YOU TO TELL WHOMEVER ASKED YOU THE VERSION — I 
DON'T WANT TO RESTATE IT, BUT THE VERSION YOU JUST 
RELATED, DID HE GIVE YOU A REASON? 
MR. JEFFS: OBJECTION, MAY I VOIR DIRE? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. HARRIS: IF IT'S FOUNDATION OR SOMETHING, 
I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE IS. 
THE COURT: I'LL PERMIT IT. GO AHEAD. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q. MR. SMITH, DO YOU HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION AFTER 
THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE TO YOU THAT YOU'VE ALLEGED 
MR. STONE MADE, THAT HE GAVE YOU ANY REASON WHY HE SAID 
THAT YOU SHOULD SAY THE VAN STALLED? DO YOU HAVE ANY 
RECOLLECTION OF SUCH -- HIM SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT WHY? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. YOU DO? 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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A. YES. 
Q. WAS IT SAID IN THE SAME CONVERSATION? 
A. YES, SIR. 
MR. JEFFS: OKAY. 
MR. HARRIS: WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO REPEAT THE 
JESTION? DO YOU REMEMBER THE QUESTION? 
CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. HARRIS: 
Q. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO REPEAT THE QUESTION? DO 
•YOU REMEMBER THE QUESTION? 
DID JOE STONE GIVE YOU A REASON WHY YOU WERE 
^SUPPOSED TO TELL THESE INVESTIGATORS THAT THE VAN 
STALLED AND SLOWED, AND SHIRLEY WAS GOING UP THE HILL 
AND HIT YOU? 
A. BECAUSE THIS LADY IS GOING TO SUE US FOR A 
LOT OF MONEY. 
Q. DID HE ALSO TELL YOU THAT IT WAS TO GIVE US 
MORE TIME TO PUT IT IN HER FAULT? 
MR. JEFFS: OBJECTION. IT'S LEADING AND 
[ SUGGESTIVE. HE CALLED HIM AS HIS WITNESS. 
THE COURT: HE'S STILL AN ADVERSE WITNESS. 
I'LL PERMIT THE QUESTION. 
THE WITNESS: I BELIEVE THAT WAS THE WHOLE 
OBJECTIVE, YES. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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Q (BY MR. HARRIS) NOW, DO YOU REMEMBER ANY 
OTHER REASONS, OTHER THAN THE TWO THAT WE JUST TALKED 
ABOUT, THAT WAS GIVEN TO YOU BY MR. STONE AS TO WHY HE 
WANTED YOU TO SAY WHAT HE WANTED YOU TO SAY? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. WERE YOU AWARE WHEN HE ASKED YOU TO DO THAT, 
THAT THAT WASN'T TRUE; WHAT HE WAS ASKING YOU TO SAY WAS 
NOT TRUE? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. IT'S DIFFERENT -- WHAT HE WAS ASKING YOU TO 
SAY IS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT YOU TOLD THIS JURY HAPPENED 
EARLIER TODAY, CORRECT? 
A. PARDON? 
Q. YOU AND I WENT THROUGH WHAT YOU REMEMBER 
HAPPENING ON JANUARY 15TH, RIGHT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. AND WE TOLD THE JURY ABOUT THAT 20 MINUTES 
AGO OR SO, RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND WHAT MR. STONE ASKED YOU TO DO AS 
COMPARED TO WHAT YOU TOLD THE JURY A FEW MINUTES AGO IS 
NOT THE TRUTH? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER ANY COMMENTS OR STATEMENTS BY 
EITHER JIM OR JOE STONE TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY EXPECTED 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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yOU TO DO THIS AS AN EMPLOYEE OF STONE CARPET? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. DID YOU HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY 
EXPECTED YOU TO DO THIS AS AN EMPLOYEE OF STONE CARPET. 
MR. JEFFS: OBJECTION, CALLS FOR A 
CONCLUSION. 
THE COURT: I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. 
Q (BY MR. HARRIS) AFTER, DID YOU HAVE AN 
UNDERSTANDING THAT IN ORDER TO KEEP YOUR JOB AT STONE 
CARPET, YOUR TWO WEEK JOB AT STONE CARPET, THEY EXPECTED 
YOU TO GO OUT AND GIVE THESE VERSIONS TO THE UPCOMING 
INVESTIGATORS? 
MR. JEFFS: OBJECTION, CALLS FOR PURE 
SPECULATION ON HIS PART AS TO THEIR THOUGHT PROCESSES. 
THE COURT: I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. 
MR. HARRIS: WHAT I'M ASKING FOR IS HIS 
UNDERSTANDING. 
MR. JEFFS: IT'S NOT RELEVANT WHAT HIS 
UNDERSTANDING WAS. 
THE COURT: I'VE SUSTAINED THE OBJECTION, 
COUNSEL. 
Q (BY MR. HARRIS) THERE CAME A TIME SHORTLY 
AFTER THIS CONVERSATION WHERE YOU WERE CONTACTED BY AN 
INVESTIGATOR, CORRECT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
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THREE SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT? 
A. 
Q. 
OF THE 
1 A-
TOYOTA 
IMPACT, 
Q. 
EXHIBIT 
A. 
TOYOTA 
YES. 
AND WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AS TO THE POSITION 
TOYOTA VAN? 
USING THE SPEED OF 28.5 MILES PER HOUR, THE 
VAN WOULD HAVE BEEN 126 FEET BACK OF THE POINT OF 
THREE SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT. 
WOULD YOU, USING A PEN, DRAW THAT ON THE 
134. 
I'M GOING TO PLACE THE FRONT END OF THE 
126 FEET BACK FROM THE TOYOTA AS POSITIONED AT 
THE POINT OF IMPACT. AND AT THAT TIME IT WOULD BE THREE 
SECONDS 
Q. 
PRIOR TO IMPACT. 
AND DID YOU ALSO MAKE A TIME/DISTANCE STUDY 
TO DETERMINE THE POSITION OF THE DODGE VAN THREE SECONDS 
PRIOR TO IMPACT? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
YES. 
WHAT POSITION DID YOU DETERMINE THAT TO BE? 
WELL, THERE ARE TWO OR THREE POSSIBILITIES. 
IF I USE THE ONE THAT COMES CLOSEST TO THE ANALYSIS, 
IT'S 10 FEET PER SECOND, 6.8 MILES PER HOUR. SO IN 
THREE SECONDS WE WOULD BE --
ON THE 
MR. MORIARITY: YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, I OBJECT 
GROUNDS HE'S TALKING ABOUT POSSIBILITIES AS 
DISTINGUISHED FROM PROBABILITIES. 
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THIS, TO THE THREE SECONDS AND 28.5 MILES, AND JUST DEAL 
WITH IT ON MY CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I THINK THAT'S 
APPROPRIATE. 
MR. MORIARITY: THANK YOU. 
Q (BY MR. JEFFS) WOULD YOU MARK THAT ONE ALSO 
FOR THE POSITION OF THE DODGE VAN. 
A. AT THE POSITION I SHOW AT 30 FEET IS WITH A 
SPEED OF 6.8 MILES PER HOUR FOR THE DODGE. 
Q. YOU'VE ALSO SAID THAT THAT DODGE WAS AT A 
SPEED FROM FIVE TO 10 MILES PER HOUR? 
A. YES. 
Q. TAKING IT AT 10 MILES PER HOUR, CAN YOU 
CALCULATE THE POSITION OF THAT VEHICLE THREE SECONDS 
PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT? 
A. YES. 10 MILES PER HOUR IS 15 FEET PER 
SECOND, 14.6 FEET PER SECOND. SO TIMES THE 15 WOULD BE 
45 FEET. AND COULD I USE A DIFFERENT PEN FOR THAT ONE. 
40 AND 50 FEET IS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 134, AND I'LL DRAW 
THAT HALFWAY BETWEEN THE FRONT END. 
SO THE BLUE WOULD BE THE DODGE AT 10 MILES 
PER HOUR AND THREE SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT. 
Q. DID YOU MAKE A CALCULATION OF THE POSITION OF 
THE VEHICLES ONE AND A HALF SECONDS BEFORE IMPACT? 
A. I DID. 
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REMIND YOU 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
YOU 
JEFFS: 
COURT: 
MOODY: 
CHIPMAN 
COURT: 
HARRIS: 
COURT: 
HARRIS: 
COURT: 
'VE BEEN 
NO QUESTIONS. 
ANY 
NO, 
OTHER QUESTIONS? 
YOUR HONOR. 
: NONE. 
MAY THE WITNESS BE EXCUSED? 
PLEASE. 
YOU 
DR. 
MAY STEP DOWN. 
ERIN BIGLER. 
IF YOU'LL BE SEATED. I WOULD 
PREVIOUSLY PLACED UNDER OATH. 
(WITNESS PREVIOUSLY SWORN) 
(CONTINUED 
EXCUSED? 
TESTIMONY OF DR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
HARRIS: 
PATIENTS IN SALT LAKE. 
TIME, THE ] 
IT AGAIN, ] 
DEPOSITION 
THE 
MR. 
LAST 
COURT: 
HARRIS: 
ERIN BIGLER) 
THANK YOU. MAY THE WITNESS BE 
PLEASE. HE'S GOT A 
YOU 
IT 
BUNCH OF 
MAY CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS. 
WAS MY INTENTION 
IS TO SIMPLY READ ABOUT — I 
BUT READ A BUNCH 
AT THIS 
HATE TO DO 
OF PAGES FROM NEWELL KNIGHT'S 
, WHICH I TOOK ON THE 27TH DAY OF 
AND I WOULD JUST ASK THAT -
IT QUICKLY AND 
THE 
MR. 
BE FINISHED. 
COURT: 
JEFFS: 
ANY 
NOT 
— I'LL READ BOTH 
OBJECTION? 
APRIL 1993. 
PARTS AND DO 
TO THE GENERALIZATION HE 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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WANTS TO READ SOME PARTS. AND AS FAR AS MR. KNIGHT'S 
BACKGROUND IS CONCERNED, I INFORMED THE COURT EARLIER WE 
WOULD NOT AGREE TO A READING OF THE DEPOSITION, AND WE 
HAD OBJECTIONS TO FOUNDATION AND HIS TESTIMONY. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. WE'LL NEED TO HAVE 
MR. KNIGHT CALLED AS A WITNESS. 
MR. HARRIS: YOUR HONOR — 
MR. CHIPMAN: HE'S OUT IN THE HALL. 
MR. HARRIS: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH BEFORE 
WE DO THAT? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
(BENCH CONFERENCE HELD) 
THE COURT: IF YOU'LL RAISE YOUR RIGHT-HAND, 
THE CLERK WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH TO YOU. 
NEWELL KNIGHT 
CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
THE COURT: IF YOU'LL BE SEATED IN THE 
WITNESS CHAIR. 
MR. HARRIS: YOUR HONOR, IF I MIGHT, I JUST 
WANT TO REMIND THE JURY THAT MR. KNIGHT IS AN ACCIDENT 
RECONSTRUCTIONIST SPECIALIST WHO WAS DESIGNATED BY 
DEFENDANT, PLEASANT GROVE CITY, IN THIS CASE AS THEIR 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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EXPERT ON RECONSTRUCTION. AND I WAS ALLOWED TO TAKE HIS 
DEPOSITION ON THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL 1993, FOLLOWING 
MR. CHIPMAN'S DESIGNATION. I WOULD LIKE TO READ CERTAIN 
PORTIONS OF THAT. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL, YOU MAY DO SO. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARRIS: 
Q. THIS WILL BE THE EASIEST EXAMINATION YOU'VE 
EVER HAD IN YOUR LIFE, MR. KNIGHT. I'M GOING TO GET 
FOUR OR FIVE YES'S OUT OF YOU, SO JUST SIT BACK AND 
RELAX. 
A. I'VE BEEN TOLD THAT BEFORE. WE'LL SEE. AND 
I WAS TOLD THAT BY ATTORNEYS, ALSO. 
Q. YES. I'M STARTING AT PAGE NUMBER 3, 
MR. KNIGHT, AT LINE 6. AND BASICALLY I'M GOING TO READ 
ALONG, AND ASK YOU IF WHAT I'VE READ IS CORRECT, AND 
THEN WE'LL MOVE ON TO THE NEXT. I'VE ONLY GOT ABOUT 25 
PERCENT OR SO OF THIS TO READ. 
A. YOU DON'T WANT ME TO READ MY ANSWERS? 
Q. I'LL BE HAPPY TO READ THEM. 
THE COURT: REMEMBER WE HAVE A REPORTER 
THAT'S SUPPOSED TO BE TAKING THIS DOWN. 
MR. HARRIS: CREED AND I HAD A LONG TALK LAST 
NIGHT. 
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HAVE NO CONVERSATION ON ANY TOPIC WITH THE ATTORNEYS, 
PARTIES OR WITNESSES. AND WE'LL BE IN RECESS UNTIL 
1:00. 
(NOON RECESS HELD) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THE JURY IS 
ALL PRESENT, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF, COUNSEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE PRESENT. AND THE WITNESS HAS RESUMED THE 
STAND. 
AND MR. JEFFS, YOU MAY CROSS-EXAMINE. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q. MR. KNIGHT, YOU HAVE DONE ACCIDENT 
RECONSTRUCTION FOR 20 PLUS OR MORE YEARS; HAVE YOU NOT? 
A. TRUE. 
Q. AND ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION AS A COMPLETE 
FUNCTION DEPENDS UPON THE GATHERING OF VARIOUS ITEMS OF 
DATA IN ORDER TO DO THE WORK; DOES IT NOT? 
A. IT DOES. 
Q. IN THIS CASE, AM I CORRECT IN UNDERSTANDING 
THAT YOU DID NOT UNDERTAKE TO DO A REGULAR ACCIDENT 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE ACCIDENT? 
A. THAT'S TRUE. 
Q. FROM THE READING OF YOUR DEPOSITION, WHICH I 
WAS NOT PRESENT FOR, IT APPEARS TO ME WHAT YOU WERE 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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A. YES. I NOT ONLY WAS CONVERSANT WITH THEM, I 
SAT ON THE TRAFFIC — LET'S SEE, IT WAS THE 
TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY TRAFFIC COMMITTEE FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH FOR ABOUT A 10 YEAR PERIOD, AND WAS A 
PARTICIPANT IN THE REVISION OF THE TRAFFIC CODE SEVERAL 
TIMES. 
Q. BASED UPON THAT EXPERIENCE AND YOUR OWN 
EXPERIENCE IN ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION, DO YOU HAVE AN 
OPINION, BASED UPON YOUR EXPERTISE AND REASONABLE 
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION PRINCIPALS, OF WHO HAD THE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY ON THIS INTERSECTION AT THIS TIME? 
MR. HARRIS: YOUR HONOR, MAY I APPROACH THE 
BENCH? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
(BENCH CONFERENCE HELD) 
MR. HARRIS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. JEFFS: WOULD YOU READ THE QUESTION BACK? 
(RECORD READ) 
Q (BY MR. JEFFS) ANSWER THAT YES OR NO. 
A. YES. 
Q. ON WHAT DO YOU BASE THAT OPINION? 
A. I BASE IT FIRST OF ALL ON THE TRAFFIC CODE. 
SECONDLY, ON THE DISTANCE THAT THE SMITH VEHICLE WENT 
AFTER ENTERING THE INTERSECTION AND THE POSITION OF THE 
TOUCHING WITHIN THAT INTERSECTION, BECAUSE THAT TELLS ME 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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WHO GETS THERE FIRST. 
Q. ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU RELIED UPON IN THAT 
REGARD? 
A. WELL, IT WOULD BE ALL OF THOSE THINGS, THOSE 
AS A PACKAGE. THEN YOU LOOK TO SEE WHO HAS 
RIGHT-OF-WAY. 
Q. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION? 
MR. HARRIS: AND I WOULD RENEW MY OBJECTION, 
YOUR HONOR; FOUNDATION, IT'S OUTSIDE THE SCOPE, AND I 
ALSO THINK IT'S INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY WHAT THE ROLE IS, RATHER THAN 
HAVING AN EX-HIGHWAY PATROLMAN INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
THE COURT: I'LL PERMIT HIM TO GIVE HIS 
OPINION. 
THE WITNESS: MY OPINION OF WHO HAD THE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY? 
Q (BY MR. JEFFS) YES. 
A. MR. SMITH DID. HE GOT THERE FIRST. 
MR. JEFFS: THANK YOU, THAT'S ALL. 
MR. MOODY: NO QUESTIONS. 
MR. CHIPMAN: NOTHING, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MR. HARRIS. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARRIS: 
Q. BASED UPON ALL THIS EXPERIENCE YOU HAD AS A 
HIGHWAY PATROLMAN, DO YOU THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE THAT 
THERE'S SOME KIND OF A RACE TO THE INTERSECTION? 
A. I HAVE NEVER SAID THAT. I DON'T BELIEVE — 
Q. IT'S NOT APPROPRIATE, IS IT? 
A. ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
Q. AND ONE — FOR EXAMPLE, MR. SMITH HERE, HE 
COULD NOT SPEED UP OR ACCELERATE TO TRY AND MAKE HIMSELF 
BE THE FIRST ONE THERE AT THE INTERSECTION, COULD HE? 
A. WELL, THE STATUTE DOESN'T SAY THAT. THE 
STATUTE DOES NOT ADDRESS THAT. BUT YOU WOULD NOT EXPECT 
THAT MOST PEOPLE WOULD RACE TO BE FIRST. BUT THAT'S --
THAT'S ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE RULE. 
Q. NOW THE STATUTE ALSO SAYS, DOES IT NOT, THAT 
THOSE THAT REACH THE INTERSECTION AT APPROXIMATELY THE 
SAME TIME, THE STATUTE PROVIDES FOR WHO HAS THE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES? 
A. THAT'S RIGHT. THAT'S A SUBPART OF THAT SAME 
SECTION OF THE CODE. 
Q. AND IF THEY REACH THERE APPROXIMATELY THE 
SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE RIGHT-OF-WAY IS TO WHOM? 
A. WELL — 
Q. DON'T WE HAVE TO DETERMINE WHO IS RIGHT AND 
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WHO IS LEFT? 
A. YOU MEAN IN POSITION? 
Q. YES, SIR. 
A. IF YOU GO TO THE B SECTION — I REFER TO IT 
AS THE B SECTION, BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT IT USED TO BE. IF 
YOU REFER TO THE B SECTION, IT SAYS THAT THEN YOU LOOK 
TO SEE WHO IS ON THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT IF THEY 
APPROACH -- AND IT USE TO SAY "AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME 
TIME." BUT THE LEGISLATURE IN THEIR WISDOM CHANGED 
THAT. 
Q. DO YOU THINK THE STATUTE HAS BEEN CHANGED? 
A. I KNOW IT'S BEEN CHANGED. I'LL GIVE YOU THE 
DATES IF YOU WOULD LIKE IT. 
Q. YOU DON'T THINK THE STATUTE CONTAINS ANY KIND 
OF LEFT TO RIGHT? 
A. OH NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT AT ALL. I SAID THE 
STATUTE HAD BEEN CHANGED. 
Q. YES. 
A. AND I'LL GIVE YOU THE DATES OF THE CHANGES, 
BUT IT DOES HAVE THE LEFT AND DOES HAVE THE RIGHT. 
Q. CURRENTLY? 
A. ABSOLUTELY. 
Q. HAD IT BEFORE, HAD IT AFTER? 
A. NO -- WELL, YEAH, IT HAD IT BEFORE, BUT 
DIDN'T HAVE THE A SECTION FROM '78 TO '79. WE GOT RID 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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THAT 
A. THANK YOU. I'LL MAKE SURE YOU GET PAID FOR 
MR. HARRIS: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
THE COURT: MR. JEFFS. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
"A" 
IS, 1 
TERM 
CODE 
THAT 
Q. MR. KNIGHT, YOU REFERRED TO THE SECTION AS AN 
SECTION. I THINK IT'S NOW SUBSECTION 1? 
A. TRUE. 
MR. HARRIS: IT'S WHERE THE YELLOW STICKER 
NEWELL. 
Q 
OF 
? 
A. 
WAS 
THE WITNESS: THAT HELPS. 
(BY MR. JEFFS) COULD YOU GIVE US WHAT THE 
THE STATUTE IS IN THE FIRST SECTION OF THAT 
1 
THE FIRST SECTION, WHICH I CALL THE "A," AND 
BECAUSE I REMEMBERED THE OLD ONE. IT SAYS. 
"THE OPERATOR OF A VEHICLE APPROACHING AN 
INTERSECTION NOT REGULATED BY AN OFFICIAL 
TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE SHALL YIELD THE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY TO ANY VEHICLE THAT HAS ENTERED 
THE INTERSECTION FROM A DIFFERENT HIGHWAY." 
THAT'S THE FIRST ONE TO THE INTERSECTION 
RULE. 
1 
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Q. SO THE ONE THAT'S APPROACHING AN INTERSECTION 
SHALL YIELD TO THE CAR THAT'S IN THE INTERSECTION? 
A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q. AND YOUR DETERMINATION IN THIS ONE WAS THAT 
SMITH ENTERED THE INTERSECTION FIRST? 
A. IT HAS TO BE. THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT 
THAT. 
MR. JEFFS: THAT'S ALL. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARRIS: 
Q. WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN YOU APPLY THAT, AS AN 
EXPERT AND POLICE OFFICER OF SOME 20 YEARS, WHERE WE 
HAVE A SITUATION HERE, FOR 27 YEARS THERE'S BEEN A STOP 
SIGN HERE AND A STOP SIGN HERE AS MRS. CARRIER HEADS UP 
1100 NORTH? 
A. OKAY. 
Q. AND AS THAT STATUTE READS, AS MRS. CARRIER --
PART ONE READS, AS MRS. CARRIER IS COMING TOWARDS THAT, 
IT'S IN AN INTERSECTION THAT HAS TWO STOP SIGNS UP — 
THAT IS A STOP SIGN REGULATED BY A TRAFFIC CONTROL 
DEVICE; IS IT NOT? 
MR. JEFFS: OBJECTION, NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF CROSS. 
THE COURT: I'LL PERMIT IT. GO AHEAD. 
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Q (BY MR. HARRIS) THAT SAYS IF YOU HAVE A 
SITUATION WHERE IT'S NOT REGULATED BY A TRAFFIC CONTROL 
DEVICE, AS MRS. CARRIER IS COMING UP, THEN WHOEVER GETS 
THERE FIRST, ASSUMING YOU DON'T RACE AND THINGS YOU AND 
I TALKED ABOUT, THEN YOU HAVE A RIGHT-OF-WAY 
DETERMINATION, CORRECT? 
A. IN THE ABSENCE OF A STOP SIGN IT'S AN OPEN 
INTERSECTION, CORRECT. 
Q. SURE. 
A. I THOUGHT THAT'S WHAT YOU ASKED. 
Q. LET'S ANALYZE IT THE WAY IT WAS AS 
MRS. CARRIER WAS DRIVING UP THE ROAD ON THAT DATE THAT 
STOP SIGN IS GONE AND THAT STOP SIGN IS UP? 
A. THAT'S TRUE. 
Q. AS A HIGHWAY PATROLMAN IS THAT A REGULATED 
INTERSECTION OR HALF REGULATED INTERSECTION; WHAT IS IT? 
A. LET ME STEP DOWN TO THE BOARD AND I'LL SHOW 
YOU. 
Q. YOU CAN DO WHATEVER YOU WANT, SURE. BUT ARE 
YOU GOING TO ANSWER MY QUESTION? 
A. THAT'S WHAT I WAS GOING TO STEP DOWN THERE 
FOR. 
Q. CAN YOU GIVE ME A YES OR NO OR I DON'T KNOW? 
A. I FORGOT THE QUESTION. 
Q. ON THAT DATE WITH THE STOP SIGN BEING DOWN, 
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Q. AND I SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN RECEIVED AS 
EXHIBIT 19-A, AND ASK YOU IF THAT IS FAMILIAR TO YOU OR 
AT LEAST 
A. 
Q. 
REFERENCE 
THAT SCENE? 
YES. 
AND DID YOU TELL ME WHERE YOU WERE AT WITH 
TO ANYTHING IN THAT PICTURE WHEN YOU FIRST SAW 
THE CARRIER VEHICLE? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
HERE? 
Q. 
A. 
(WITNESS 
Q. 
YES. 
WHERE DID YOU VIEW THE CARRIER VEHICLE FROM? 
DO YOU WANT ME TO SHOW ON YOU THE PICTURE 
YES. 
I WAS APPROXIMATELY IN THIS AREA UP HERE 
INDICATING ON EXHIBIT). 
DID YOU SEE THE CARRIER VEHICLE IN YOUR VIEW 
BETWEEN THE TREE AND THE HOUSE? 
A. 
Q. 
SAW THAT? 
A. 
Q. 
YES. 
AND YOU SHOWED ME WHERE YOU WERE AT WHEN YOU 
YES. 
NOW, AFTER YOU SAW THAT VEHICLE, YOU ONLY SAW 
IT IN THAT DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TREE AND THE HOUSE AS IT 
WENT PAST 
A. 
Q. 
YOUR VIEW, RIGHT? 
YES. 
AFTER SHE GOT BEHIND THE TREE YOU COULDN'T 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
EXHIBIT J 
INSTRUCTION NO. _ l 3 _ 
You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(2) 
provides: when more than one vehicle enters or approaches an 
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time at 
the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic control device is 
inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way 
to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer. 
I 
If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that William 
Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation of the foregoing 
statute, such conduct creates a presumption of negligence. 
EXHIBIT K 
INSTRUCTION NO. tfS 
You are instructed that the Utah Code § 41-6-72(1) provides: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection 
not regulated by an official traffic-control device shall yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle that has entered the 
intersection from a different highway. 
EXHIBIT L 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3b 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
the same time and arQr-zg^feg^ati nll.y thre^i^uae- distance from it, 
the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it 
is the duty of the driver approaching on the left to yield the 
right-of-way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-
of-way. However, a driver may not speed up to enter an 
intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by 
entering the intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In 
order for a driver approaching from the left to take the right-
of-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of 
the driver approaching from the right. 
muji 5.10 ,~> «
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EXHIBIT M 
INSTRUCTION NO. &&" 
You are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(1) provides: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an 
intersection not regulated by an official traffic-
control device shall yield the right-of-way to any 
vehicle that has entered the intersection from a 
different highway. 
Your are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(2) provides: 
(2) When more than one vehicle enters or 
approaches an intersection from different highways 
at approximately the same time and the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official 
traffic control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic 
control device is inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by 
stop signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the 
vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer. 
References: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(1) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(2) 
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EXHIBIT N 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and 
distance from it, the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it is the duty 
of the driver approaching on the left to yield the right-of-way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-way. However, a driver may not 
speed up to enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by entering the 
intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In order for a driver approaching from the left 
to take the right-of-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of the driver 
approaching from the right. 
EXHIBIT O 
VOL X-Doc.# 2533 
THE STATUTE SPECIFICALLY IN 41-6-72 (2). THE JUDGE HAS 
TAKEN THAT AND NOT USED THE EXACT LANGUAGE, AND COMBINED 
IT IN AN INSTRUCTION BY MR. CHIPMAN, AND ALSO COMBINED 
WITH IT ON THE SAME PAGE, 41-6-72 (1). AND I THINK THEY 
SHOULD SPECIFICALLY HAVE THE STATUTE QUOTED AND NOT HAVE 
IT BE LAWYERIZED OR PUT OTHER DATA AND INFORMATION INTO 
IT. AND THEY SHOULD BE DONE SEPARATELY. IN ESSENCE MY 
INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN, BUT I THINK IN A COMBINED AND 
CONDENSED FORM, WHICH MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE 
JURY TO UNDERSTAND. ALSO, THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF MY #19 
WHICH IS -- LET ME MAKE IT SPECIFIC HERE. IT APPLIES TO 
A BUNCH OF OTHERS. IT HAS AN INTRODUCTORY SENTENCE THAT 
SAYS, "IF YOU FIND AFTER A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT WILLIAM ROGER SMITH WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE 
IN VIOLATION OF AFOREGOING STATUTE, SUCH CONDUCT CREATES 
A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE..." AND THAT PARAGRAPH I'VE 
REQUESTED ON 19, 20, 21, 22 AND 23. AND ALTHOUGH THE 
JUDGE HAS GIVEN A NUMBER OF THOSE INSTRUCTIONS, HE HAS 
GIVEN IT WITHOUT THAT FINAL CLARIFATORY (SIC) SENTENCE, 
WHICH I THINK APPLIES BACK TO THE PRIOR INSTRUCTION AND 
HELPS THE JURY UNDERSTAND BETTER WHAT THEY'RE APPLYING 
HERE. 
OKAY, THEN WITH THE REST OF THOSE WE'RE UP TO 
23. I'VE ALREADY STATED MY LONE OBJECTION TO THOSE. 
23, 24 AND 25 ARE ALL GIVEN IN ESSENCE, BUT THEY, AGAIN, 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
EXHIBIT P 
VOL X-DoC.# 2538 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE. 
NUMBER 31, THIS IS THE ONE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
INSTRUCTION WHICH DOES NOT TAKE THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF 
THE STATUTE. IT COMBINES BOTH OF THE POTENTIALLY 
APPLICABLE STATUTES INTO ONE. IT AGAIN USES — REDUCES 
IT TO PROSE, AND THOUGH THE COURT WAS KIND ENOUGH TO 
MAKE SOME CHANGES TO THIS AND INSERT SOME OF THE STATUTE 
SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, IT NONETHELESS COULD BE DONE MORE 
ACCURATELY, MORE CLEARLY DONE FOR THE JURY IF IT WAS 
BROKEN INTO TWO INSTRUCTIONS AND USE THE STATUTE ITSELF. 
33, I DO NOT TAKE EXCEPTION TO. 
32, I DO NOT TAKE EXCEPTION TO. 
33, IS FINE. 
34, IS FINE. 
35, IS FINE. 
THE ONLY CHANGES I WOULD LIKE IN 33, 34 AND 
35, AGAIN IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FINAL PARAGRAPH ABOUT 
WHAT THE EFFECT IS, THAT IT IS A PRESUMPTION AND REFERS 
BACK TO THE PRIOR INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH ON THE 
STATUTORY VIOLATION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE ON 
THAT. 
NUMBER 36 IS THE DAMAGE INSTRUCTION, WHICH IS 
TWO PAGES LONG, THE INTRODUCTORY DAMAGE INSTRUCTION. 
I'VE TOLD THE COURT I THINK IT'S NEGATIVE IN TONE AND 
ATTEMPTS TO DO TOO MUCH IN ONE INSTRUCTION. AND IT 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
EXHIBIT Q 
CERTIFIED COPY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 1 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
SHIRLEY CARRIER, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION 
STONE 
ROGER 
db 
CARPETS, WILLIAM 
SMITH, 
Defendants . 
a 
an d : 
DEPOSITION OF: 
NEWELL G. KNIGHT 
Civil No. 910400680 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of 
April, 1993, the deposition of NEWELL G. KNIGHT, 
produced as a witness herein, at the instance of the 
plaintiffs herein, in the above-entitled action now 
pending in the above-named court, was taken before 
DEBRA A. DIBBLE, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing 
at the hour of 3:30 p.m., of said day at the offices of 
SPENCE, MORIARITY & SCHUSTER, 3325 N. University Ave., 
Suite 200-B, Provo, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to 
notice. 
Associated Professional Reporters 
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Q. (BY MR. JEFFS) And you found that Mr. Smith 
entered this intersection first? 
A. I did. 
MR. JEFFS: That's all I have. 
MR. HARRIS: That's all. 
(Whereupon the deposition 
was concluded at 5:25 p.m.) 
* * * 
